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Abstract—This work considers the problem of secure and
reliable information transmission via relay cooperation in two-
hop relay wireless networks without the information of both
eavesdropper channels and locations. While previous work on this
problem mainly studied infinite networks and their asymptotic
behavior and scaling law results, this papers focuses on a
more practical network with finite number of system nodes
and explores the corresponding exact result on the number of
eavesdroppers one network can tolerant to ensure desired secrecy
and reliability. We first study the scenario where path-loss is
equal between all pairs of nodes and consider two transmission
protocols there, one adopts an optimal but complex relay selection
process with less load balance capacity while the other adopts a
random but simple relay selection process with good load balance
capacity. Theoretical analysis is then provided to determine the
maximum number of eavesdroppers one network can tolerate to
ensure a desired performance in terms of the secrecy outage
probability and transmission outage probability. We further
extend our study to the more general scenario where path-loss
between each pair of nodes also depends the distance between
them, for which a new transmission protocol with both preferable
relay selection and good load balance as well as the corresponding
theoretical analysis are presented.
Index Terms—Two-Hop Wireless Networks, Cooperative Relay,
Physical Layer Security, Transmission Outage, Secrecy Outage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two-hop ad hoc wireless networks, where each packet
travels at most two hops (source-relay-destination) to reach
its destination, have been a class of basic and important
networking scenarios [1]. Actually, the analysis of basic two-
hop relay networks serves as the foundation for performance
study of general multi-hop networks. Due to the promising
applications of ad hoc wireless networks in many important
scenarios (like battlefield networks, vehicle networks, disaster
recovery networks), the consideration of secrecy (and also
reliability) in such networks is of great importance for ensuring
the high confidentiality requirements of these applications.
Traditionally, the information security is provided by adopt-
ing the cryptography approach, where a plain message is
encrypted through a cryptographic algorithm that is hard to
break (decrypt) in practice by any adversary without the key.
While the cryptography is acceptable for general applications
with standard security requirement, it may not be sufficient for
applications with a requirement of strong form of security (like
military networks and emergency networks). This is because
that the cryptographic approach can hardly achieve everlast-
ing secrecy, since the adversary can record the transmitted
messages and try any way to break them [2]. That is why
there is an increasing interest in applying signaling scheme
in physical layer to provide a strong form of security, where
a degraded signal at an eavesdropper is always ensured such
that the original data can be hardly recovered regardless of
how the signal is processed at the eavesdropper. We consider
applying physical layer method to achieve secure and reliable
information transmission in the two-hop wireless networks.
By now, a lot of research works have been dedicated to the
study of physical layer security based on cooperative relays
and artificial noise, and these works can be roughly classified
into two categories depending on whether the information of
eavesdroppers channels and locations is known or not (see
Section V for related works). For the case that the information
of eavesdroppers channels and locations is available, a lot
of transmission schemes have been proposed to achieve the
maximum secrecy rates while optimizing the artificial noise
generation and power control to reduce the total transmission
power consumption [3-19]. In practice, however, it is diffi-
cult to gain the information of eavesdropper channels and
locations, since the eavesdroppers always try to hide their
identity information as much as possible. To alleviate such a
requirement on eavesdroppers information, some recent works
explored the implementation of secure and reliable information
transmission in wireless networks without the information
of both eavesdropper channels and locations [20-28]. It is
notable, however, that these works mainly focus on exploring
the scaling law results in terms of the number of eavesdroppers
one network can tolerate as the number of system nodes there
tends to infinity. Although the scaling law results are helpful
for us to understand the general asymptotic network behavior,
they tell us a little about the actual and exact number of
eavesdroppers one network can tolerate. In practice, however,
such exact results are of great interest for network designers.
This paper focuses on applying the relay cooperation to
achieve secure and reliable information transmission in a
more practical finite two-hop wireless network without the
knowledge of both eavesdropper channels and locations. The
main contributions of this paper as follows.
2• For achieving secure and reliable information transmis-
sion in a more practical two-hop wireless network with
finite number of system nodes and equal path-loss be-
tween all pairs of nodes, we consider the application of
the cooperative protocol proposed in [21] with an optimal
and complex relay selection process but less load balance
capacity, and also propose to use a new cooperative
protocol with a simple and random relay selection process
but good load balance capacity.
• Rather than exploring the asymptotic behavior and scaling
law results, we provide theoretic analysis for above two
cooperative protocols to determine the corresponding
exact results on the number of eavesdroppers one network
can tolerate to meet a specified requirement in terms
of the maximum secrecy outage probability and the
maximum transmission outage probability allowed.
• We further extend our study to the more general and
practical scenario where the path-loss between each pair
of nodes also depends on their relative locations, for
which we propose a new transmission protocol with both
preferable relay selection and good load balance and also
present the corresponding theoretical analysis under this
new protocol.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents system models and also introduces transmission
outage and secrecy outage for the analysis of transmission
protocols. Section III considers two transmission protocols for
the scenario of equal path-loss between all pairs of nodes and
provides the corresponding theoretical analysis. Section IV
further presents a new transmission protocol and its theoretical
analysis to address distance-dependent path-loss issue. Section
V introduces the related works and Section VI concludes this
paper.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
A. Network Model
As illustrated in Fig.1 that we consider a network scenario
where a source node S wishes to communicate securely
with its destination node D with the help of multiple relay
nodes R1, R2, · · · , Rn. In addition to these normal system
nodes, there are also m eavesdroppers E1, E2, · · · , Em
that are independent and also uniformly distributed in the
network. Our goal here is to ensure the secure and reliable
information transmission from source S to destinationD under
the condition that no real time information is available about
both eavesdropper channels and locations.
B. Transmission Model
Consider the transmission from a transmitter A to a receiver
B, and denote by x(A)i the ith symbol transmitted by A and
denote by y(B)i the ith signal received by B. We assume
that all nodes transmit with the same power Es, path-loss
between all pairs of nodes is independent, and the frequency-
nonselective multi-path fading from A to B is a complex zero-
mean Gaussian random variable. Under the condition that all
nodes in a group of nodes, R, are generating noises, the ith
signal received at node B from node A is determined as:
S
D
R1
R3
R4
R2
E1
E2 E3
E4
Fig. 1. System scenario: Source S wishes to communicate securely with
destination D with the assistance of finite relays R1, R2, · · · , Rn (n=4 in
the figure) in the presence of passive eavesdroppers E1, E2, · · · , Em (m=4
in the figure). Cooperative relay scheme is used in the two-hop transmission.
A assistant node is selected randomly as relay (R1 in the figure).
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where α ≥ 2 is the path-loss exponent. The noise
{
n
(B)
i
}
at receiver B is assumed to be i.i.d complex Gaussian random
variables with E
[∣∣∣n(B)i ∣∣∣2
]
= N0, and |hA,B|2 is exponentially
distributed with mean E
[
|hA,B|2
]
. Without loss of generality,
we assume that E
[
|hA,B|2
]
= 1. The SINR CA,B from A to
B is then given by
CA,B =
Es |hA,B|2 d−αA,B∑
Ai∈REs|hAi,B|
2
d−αAi,B +N0/2
For a legitimate node and an eavesdropper, we use two sepa-
rate SINR thresholds γR and γE to define the minimum SINR
required to recover the transmitted messages for legitimate
node and eavesdropper, respectively. Therefore, a system node
(relay or destination) is able to decode a packet if and only
if its SINR is greater than γR, while the transmitted message
is secure if and only if the SINR at each eavesdropper is less
than γE .
C. Transmission Outage and Secrecy Outage
For a transmission from the source S to destination D,
we call transmission outage happens if D can not decode
the transmitted packet, i.e., D received the packet with SINR
less than the predefined threshold γR. The transmission outage
probability, denoted as P (T )out , is then defined as the probability
that transmission outage from S to D happens. For a prede-
fined upper bound εt on P (T )out , we call the communication
between S and D is reliable if P (T )out ≤ εt. Notice that for the
transmissions from S to the selected relay Rj∗ and from Rj∗
to D, the corresponding transmission outage can be defined in
the similar way as that of from S to D. We use O(T )S→Rj∗ and
O
(T )
Rj∗→D to denote the events that transmission outage from
source S to Rj∗ happens and transmission outage from relay
Rj∗ to D happens, respectively. Due to the link independence
assumption, we have
3P
(T )
out = P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗ ∪O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
= P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
Regarding the secrecy outage, we call secrecy outage hap-
pens for a transmission from S to D if at least one eaves-
dropper can recover the transmitted packets during the process
of this two-hop transmission, i.e., at least one eavesdropper
received the packet with SINR larger than the predefined
threshold γE . The secrecy outage probability, denoted as P (S)out ,
is then defined as the probability that secrecy outage happens
during the transmission from S to D. For a predefined upper
bound εs on P (S)out , we call the communication between S and
D is secure if P (S)out ≤ εs. Notice that for the transmissions
from S to the selected relay Rj∗ and from Rj∗ to D, the
corresponding secrecy outage can be defined in the similar
way as that of from S to D. We use O(S)S→Rj∗ and O
(S)
Rj∗→D
to denote the events that secrecy outage from source S to Rj∗
happens and secrecy outage from relay Rj∗ to D happens,
respectively. Again, due to the link independence assumption,
we have
P
(S)
out = P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
III. SECURE AND RELIABLE TRANSMISSION UNDER
EQUAL PATH-LOSS
In this section, we consider the case where the path-loss is
equal between all pairs of nodes in the system (i.e., we set
dA,B = 1 for all A 6= B). We first introduce two transmission
protocols considered for such scenario, and then provide
theoretical analysis to determine the numbers of eavesdroppers
one network can tolerate under these protocols.
A. Transmission Protocols
The first protocol we consider (hereafter called Protocol 1)
is the one proposed in [21], in which the optimal relay node
with the best link condition to both source and destination
is always selected for information relaying. Notice that al-
though the Protocol 1 can guarantee the optimal relay node
selection, it suffers from several problems. Protocol 1 involves
a complicated process of optimal relay selection, which is
not very suitable for the distributed wireless networks, in
particular when the number of possible relay nodes is huge.
More importantly, since the channel state is relatively constant
during a fixed time period, some relay nodes with good
link conditions are always preferred for information relaying,
resulting in a severe load balance problem and a quick node
energy depletion in energy-limited wireless environment.
Based on above observations, we propose to use a simple
and random relay selection rather than the optimal relay
selection in Protocol 1 to achieve a better load and energy
consumption balance among possible relay nodes. By modi-
fying the Protocol 1, the new transmission protocol (hereafter
called Protocol 2) works as follows.
1) Relay selection: A relay node, indexed by j∗, is randomly
selected from all candidate relay nodes Rj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
2) Channel measurement: The selected relay Rj∗ broad-
casts a pilot signal to allow each of other relays to measure the
channel from Rj∗ to itself. Each of the other relays Rj , j =
1, 2, · · · , n, j 6= j∗ then knows the corresponding value of
hRj ,Rj∗ . Similarly, the destination D broadcasts a pilot signal
to allow each of other relays to measure the channel from D
to itself. Each of the other relays Rj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n, j 6= j∗
then knows the corresponding value of hRj ,D.
3) Message transmission: The source S transmits the mes-
sages to Rj∗ , and concurrently, the relay nodes with indexes
in R1 =
{
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
transmit noise to generate
interference at eavesdroppers. The relay Rj∗ then transmits the
messages to destination D, and concurrently, the relay nodes
with indexes in R2 =
{
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,D|2 < τ
}
transmit noise
to generate interference at eavesdroppers.
Remark 1: The parameter τ involved in the Protocol 1
and Protocol 2 serves as the threshold on path-loss, based on
which the set of noise generating relay nodes can be identified.
Notice that a too large τ may disable legitimate transmission,
while a too small τ may not be sufficient for interrupting all
eavesdroppers. Thus, the parameter τ should be set properly to
ensure both secrecy requirement and reliability requirement.
Remark 2: The two protocols considered here have their
own advantages and disadvantages and thus are suitable for
different network scenarios. For the protocol 1, it can achieve
a better performance in terms of the number of eavesdroppers
can be tolerated (see Theorem 1). However, it involves a com-
plex relay selection process, and more importantly, it results
in an unbalanced load and energy consumption distribution
among systems nodes. Thus, such protocol is suitable for
small scale wireless network with sufficient energy supply
rather than large and energy-limited wireless networks (like
wireless sensor networks). Regarding the Protocol 2, although
it can tolerate less number eavesdroppers in comparison with
the Protocol 1 (see Theorem 2), it involves a very simple
random relay selection process to achieve a good load and
energy consumption distribution among system nodes. Thus,
this protocol is more suitable for large scale wireless network
environment with stringent energy consumption constraint.
B. Analysis of Protocol 1
We now analyze that under the Protocol 1 the number of
eavesdroppers one network can tolerate subject to specified
requirements on transmission outage and secrecy outage. We
first establish the following two lemmas regarding some basic
properties of P (T )out , P
(S)
out and τ , which will help us to derive
the main result in Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with equal
path-loss between all pairs of nodes, under the Protocol 1
the transmission outage probability P (T )out and secrecy outage
probability P (S)out there satisfy the following conditions.
4P
(T )
out ≤ 2
[
1− e−2γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]n
−
[
1− e−2γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]2n
P
(S)
out ≤ 2m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
−
[
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ)]2
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in the Appendix A.
Lemma 2: Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with equal
path-loss between all pairs of nodes, to ensure P (T )out ≤ εt and
P
(S)
out ≤ εs under the Protocol 1, the parameter τ must satisfy
the following condition.
τ ≤
√√√√− log [1− (1−√1− εt) 1n ]
2γR (n− 1)
and
τ ≥ − log

1 + log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)


Proof:
• Reliability Guarantee
To ensure the reliability requirement P (T )out ≤ εt, we know
from the Lemma 1 that we just need
2
[
1− e−2γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]n
−
[
1− e−2γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]2n
≤ εt
Thus, [
1− e−2γR(n−1)(1−e−τ)τ
]n
≤ 1−√1− εt
That is,
−2γR (n− 1)
(
1− e−τ) τ ≥ log [1− (1−√1− εt) 1n ]
By using Taylor formula, we have
τ ≤
√√√√− log [1− (1−√1− εt) 1n ]
2γR (n− 1)
The above result indicates the maximum value the parameter
τ we can take to ensure the reliability requirement.
• Secrecy Guarantee
To ensure the secrecy requirement P (S)out ≤ εs , we know
from the Lemma 1 that we just need
2m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ)
−
[
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )]2
≤ εs
Thus,
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−√1− εs
That is,
τ ≥ − log

1 + log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)


The above result implies the minimum value parameter τ
we can take to guarantee the secrecy requirement.
Based on the results of Lemma 2, we now can establish the
following theorem regarding the performance of Protocol 1.
Theorem 1. Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with
equal path-loss between all pairs of nodes. To guarantee
P
(T )
out ≤ εt and P (S)out ≤ εs under the Protocol 1, the number
of eavesdroppers m one network can tolerate must satisfy the
following condition.
m ≤ (1−√1− εs) · (1 + γE)
√√√√−(n−1) log[1−(1−√1−εt) 1n ]
2γR
Proof:
From Lemma 2, we know that to ensure the reliability
requirement, we have
τ ≤
√√√√− log [1− (1−√1− εt) 1n ]
2γR (n− 1)
and
(n− 1) (1− e−τ) ≤ − log
[
1− (1−√1− εt) 1n ]
2γRτ
To ensure the secrecy requirement, we need
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
m
Thus,
5m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs(
1
1+γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
(
1
1+γE
)− log[1−(1−√1−εt) 1n ]
2γRτ
By letting τ to take its maximum value for maximum
interference at eavesdroppers, we get the following bound
m ≤ (1−√1− εs) · (1 + γE)
√√√√−(n−1) log[1−(1−√1−εt) 1n ]
2γR
C. Analysis of Protocol 2
Similar to the analysis of Protocol 1, we first establish
the following two lemmas regarding some basic properties of
P
(T )
out , P
(S)
out and τ under the Protocol 2.
Lemma 3: Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with equal
path-loss between all pairs of nodes, the transmission outage
probability P (T )out and secrecy outage probability P
(S)
out under
the Protocol 2 satisfy the following conditions.
P
(T )
out ≤ 2
[
1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]
−
[
1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]2
P
(S)
out ≤ 2m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
−
[
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ)]2
The proof of Lemma 3 can be found in the Appendix B.
Lemma 4: Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with equal
path-loss between all pairs of nodes, to ensure P (T )out ≤ εt and
P
(S)
out ≤ εs under the Protocol 2, the parameter τ must satisfy
the following condition.
τ ∈

− log

1 + log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)

,
√
− log (1− εt)
2γR (n− 1)


Proof:
• Reliability Guarantee
To ensure the reliability requirement P (T )out ≤ εt, we know
from Lemma 4 that we just need
2
[
1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]
−
[
1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]2
≤ εt
That is,
1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ ≤ 1−√1− εt
By using Taylor formula, we have
τ ≤
√
− log (1− εt)
2γR (n− 1)
• Secrecy Guarantee
Notice that the secrecy outage probability of Protocol 1 and
Protocol 2 is same. Thus, to ensure the secrecy requirement,
we need
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
m
Thus,
τ ≥ − log

1 + log
(
1−√1−εs
m
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γE)


The above result implies the minimum value parameter τ
can take to guarantee the secrecy requirement.
Theorem 2. Consider the network scenario of Fig 1 with
equal path-loss between all pairs of nodes. To guarantee
P
(T )
out ≤ εt and P (S)out ≤ εs based on the Protocol 2, the number
of eavesdroppers m the network can tolerate must satisfy the
following condition.
m ≤ (1−√1− εs) · (1 + γE)√−(n−1) log(1−εt)2γR
Proof:
From Lemma 4, we know that to ensure the reliability
requirement, we have
τ ≤
√
− log (1− εt)
2γR (n− 1)
and
(n− 1) (1− e−τ) ≤ − log (1− εt)
2γRτ
To ensure the secrecy requirement, we need
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
m
Thus,
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs(
1
1+γE
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
≤ 1−
√
1− εs(
1
1+γE
)− log(1−εt)
2γRτ
6(0,0) (a,0) (1-a,0) (1,0)
S D
(0,1) (a,1) (1-a,1) (1,1)
(0,b)
(0,1-b)
r
rRj*
Ei
Rj
Relay selected 
from this region
(x,y)
(xEi, yEi)
(xRj*, yRj*)
dx
dy
Fig. 2. Coordinate system for the scenario where path-loss between pairs of
nodes is based on their relative locations.
By letting τ to take its maximum value for maximum
interference at eavesdroppers, we get the following bound
m ≤ (1−√1− εs) · (1 + γE)√−(n−1) log(1−εt)2γR
IV. SECURE AND RELIABLE TRANSMISSION UNDER
DISTANCE-DEPENDENT PATH-LOSS
In this section, we consider the more general scenario
where the path-loss between each pair of nodes also depends
the distance between them. We first introduce the coordi-
nate system adopted in our discussion, and then propose a
flexible transmission protocol to achieve both the preferable
relay selection and good load balance under such distance-
dependent path-loss scenario. The related theoretic analysis is
further provided to determine the number of eavesdroppers
one network can tolerate by adopting this protocol.
A. Coordinate System
To address the distance-dependent path-loss, we consider
a two-hop relay wireless network deployed in a square of
unit area and defined by the the coordinate system shown
in Fig.2, where the source S located at coordinate (0, 0.5)
wishes to establish two-hop transmission with destination D
located at coordinate (1, 0.5). In addition to the source S and
destination D, we assume that there are n cooperative relays
and m eavesdroppers of unknown channels and locations
independently and uniformly distributed in the network area.
B. Transmission Protocol
Notice that under the distance-dependent path-loss scenario,
the further the distance between a transmitter and a receiver,
the weaker the signal received at the receiver. Thus, the system
nodes located in the middle region between source S and des-
tination D are preferable relays. Based such observation, we
propose here a general and practical protocol (hereafter called
Protocol 3) to ensure both the preferable relay selection and
good load balance for distance-dependent path-loss scenario,
which works as follow.
1) Relay selection: Based on two parameters a and b, 0 ≤
a ≤ 0.5, 0 ≤ b ≤ 0.5, we first define a relay selection region
[a, 1− a] × [b, 1− b] between source S and destination D.
A relay node, indexed by j∗, is then selected randomly from
relays falling within the relay selection region.
2) Channel measurement: Each of the other relays mea-
sures the channel from the selected relay Rj∗ and destination
D by accepting the pilot signal from Rj∗ and D for determin-
ing the noise generation nodes.
3) Two-hop transmission: The source S and the se-
lected relay Rj∗ transmit the messages in two-hop transmis-
sion. Concurrently, the relay nodes with indexes in R1 ={
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
in the first hop and the relay nodes
with indexes in R2 =
{
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,D|2 < τ
}
in the second
hop transmit noise respectively to help transmission.
Remark 4: In the Protocol 3, a trade off between the
preferable relay selection and better load balance can be
controlled through the parameters a and b, which define the
relay selection region. As to be shown in Theorem 3 that
by adopting a small value for both a and b (i.e., a larger
relay selection region), a better load balance capacity can be
achieved at the cost of a smaller number of eavesdroppers one
network can tolerant.
C. Analysis of Protocol 3
To address the near eavesdropper problem and also to
simply the analysis for the Protocol 3, we assume that there
exits a constant r0 > 0 such that any eavesdropper falling
within a circle area with radius r0 and center S or Rj∗
can eavesdrop the transmitted messages successfully with
probability 1, while any eavesdropper beyond such area can
only successfully eavesdropper the transmitted messages with
a probability less than 1. Based on such a simplification, we
can establish the following two lemmas regarding some basic
properties of P (T )out , P
(S)
out and τ under this protocol.
Lemma 5: Consider the network scenario of Fig 2, under
the Protocol 3 the transmission outage probability P (T )out and
secrecy outage probability P (S)out there satisfy the following
conditions.
P
(T )
out ≤
[
1− e−
γRτ(n−1)(1−e−τ )
φ−α
(ϕ1+ϕ2)
]
(1− ϑ) + 1 · ϑ
P
(S)
out ≤ 2m
[
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pir02
)]
−
[
m
(
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pir02
))]2
7here,
ϑ =
[
1− (1− 2a) (1− 2b)
]n
ϕ1 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1[
(x− 0.5)2 + (y − 0.5)2
]α
2
dxdy
ϕ2 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1[
(x− 1)2 + (y − 0.5)2
]α
2
dxdy
φ =
√
(1− a)2 + (0.5− b)2
ψ =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1
(x2 + y2)
α
2
dxdy
The proof of the Lemma 5 can be found in the Appendix
C.
Lemma 6: Consider the network scenario of Fig 2, to ensure
P
(T )
out ≤ εt and P (S)out ≤ εs by applying the Protocol 3, the
parameter τ must satisfy the following condition.
τ ≤
√√√√ − log(1−εt1−ϑ )φ−α
γR(n− 1) (ϕ1 + ϕ2)
and
τ ≥ − log

1 +
log
(
1−
√
1−εs
m
−pir02
1−pir02
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γEψr0α)


here, ϑ, ϕ1, ϕ2, φ and ψ are defined in the same way as
that in Lemma 5.
Proof:
• Reliability Guarantee
To ensure the reliability requirement P (T )out ≤ εt, we know
from Lemma 5 that we just need
[
1− e−
γRτ(n−1)(1−e−τ)
φ−α
(ϕ1+ϕ2)
]
(1− ϑ) + 1 · ϑ ≤ εt
that is,
−γRτ (n− 1) (1− e
−τ )
φ−α
(ϕ1 + ϕ2) ≥ log
(
1− εt
1 − ϑ
)
By using Taylor formula, we have
τ ≤
√√√√ − log(1−εt1−ϑ )φ−α
γR(n− 1) (ϕ1 + ϕ2)
• Secrecy Guarantee
To ensure the secrecy requirement P (S)out ≤ εs, we know
from Lemma 5 that we just need
2m
[
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pir02
)]−
[
m
(
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pir02
))]2
≤ εs
Thus,
m ·
[
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pir02
)]
≤ 1−√1− εs
That is,
τ ≥ − log

1 +
log
(
1−
√
1−εs
m
−pir02
1−pir02
)
(n− 1) log (1 + γEψr0α)


Based on the results of Lemma 6, we now can establish the
following theorem about the performance of Protocol 3.
Theorem 3. Consider the network scenario of Fig 2. To
guarantee P (T )out ≤ εt and P (S)out ≤ εs based on the Protocol 3,
the number of eavesdroppers m the network can tolerate must
satisfy the following condition.
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs
pir02 + (1− pir02)ω
here,
ω = (1 + γEψr0
α)
−
√
−(n−1) log( 1−εt1−ϑ )
γR(ϕ1+ϕ2)φ
α
ϑ, ϕ1, ϕ2, φ and ψ are defined in the same way as that in
Lemma 5.
Proof:
From Lemma 6, we know that to ensure the reliability
requirement, we have
τ ≤
√√√√ − log(1−εt1−ϑ )φ−α
γR(n− 1) (ϕ1 + ϕ2)
and
(n− 1) (1− e−τ) ≤ − log
(
1−εt
1−ϑ
)
γRτφα (ϕ1 + ϕ2)
To ensure the secrecy requirement, we need
8m ·
[
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pir02
)]
≤ 1−√1− εs
Thus,
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs
pir02 +
(
1
1+γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
(1− pir02)
≤ 1−
√
1− εs
pir02 +
(
1
1+γEψr0α
) − log ( 1−εt1−ϑ )
γRτφ
α(ϕ1+ϕ2)
(1− pir02)
By letting τ to take its maximum value for maximum
interference at eavesdroppers, we get the following bound
m ≤ 1−
√
1− εs
pir02 + (1− pir02)ω
Here,
ω = (1 + γEψr0
α)
−
√
−(n−1) log( 1−εt1−ϑ )
γR(ϕ1+ϕ2)φ
α
V. RELATED WORKS
A lot of research works have been dedicated to the im-
plementation of physical layer security by adopting artificial
noise generation for cooperative jamming. These works can be
roughly classified into two categories depending on weather
the information of eavesdroppers channels and locations is
known or not.
For the case that the information of eavesdroppers channels
and locations is available, many methods can be employed to
improve physical layers security by optimizing the artificial
noise generation and power control. In case that the global
channel state information is available, to achieve the goal
of maximizing the secrecy rates while minimizing the total
transmit power, a few cooperative transmission schemes have
been proposed in [3][4][5], and for two-hop wireless networks
the optimal transmission strategies were presented in [6][7].
With respect to small networks, cooperative jamming with
multiple relays and multiple eavesdroppers and knowledge
of channels and locations was considered in [8][9]. Even if
only local channel information rather than global channel
state information is known, it was proved that the near-
optimal secrecy rate can achieved by cooperative jamming
schemes [10][11]. Except channel information, the relative
locations were also considered for optimizing cooperative
jamming and power allocation to disrupt an eavesdropper with
known location [12][13]. In addition, L. Lai et al. established
the utility of user cooperation in facilitating secure wireless
communications and proposed cooperation strategies in the
additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel [14], R.
Negi et al. showed how artificially generated noise can be
added to the information bearing signal to achieve secrecy in
the multiple and single antenna scenario under the constraint
on total power transmitted by all nodes [15]. The physical
layer security issues in a two-way untrusted relay system
was also investigated with friendly jammers in [16][17]. The
cooperative communications in mobile ad hoc networks was
discussed in [18]. Effective criteria for relay and jamming node
selection were developed to ensure nonzero secrecy rate in
case of given sufficient relays in [19].
For the case that the information of eavesdropper channels
and locations is unknown, the works in [20][21] consid-
ered the secrecy for two-hop wireless networks, the works
in [22][23][24] considered the secrecy for large wireless
networks, and the further work in [25] considered the en-
ergy efficiency cooperative jamming strategies. These works
considered how cooperative jamming by friendly nodes can
impact the security of the network and compared it with a
straightforward approach based on multi-user diversity. They
also proposed some protocols to embed cooperative jamming
techniques for protecting single links into a large multi-hop
network and explored network scaling results on the number
of eavesdroppers one network can tolerate. A.Sheikholeslami
et al. explored the interference from multiple cooperative
sessions to confuse the eavesdroppers in a large wireless
network [28]. The cooperative relay scheme for the broadcast
channel was further investigated in [26][27].
VI. CONCLUSION
To achieve reliable and secure information transmission in a
two-hop relay wireless network in presence of eavesdroppers
with unknown channels and locations, several transmission
protocols based on relay cooperation have been considered. In
particular, theoretical analysis has been conducted to under-
stand that under each of these protocols how many eavesdrop-
pers one network can tolerant to meet a specified requirement
on the maximum allowed secrecy outage probability and trans-
mission outage probability. Our results in this paper indicate
that these protocols actually have different performance in
terms of eavesdropper-tolerance capacity and load balance
capacity among relays, and in general it is possible for us
to select a proper transmission protocol according to network
scenario such that a desired trade off between the overall
eavesdropper-tolerance capacity and load balance among relay
nodes can be achieved.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof:
Notice that P (T )out is determined as
P
(T )
out = P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
Based on the definition of transmission outage probability,
we have
9P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
CS,Rj∗ ≤ γR
)
= P
(
Es · |hS,Rj∗ |2∑
Rj∈R1 Es · |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 +N0/2
≤ γR
)
.
= P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2∑
Rj∈R1 |hRj ,Rj∗ |2
≤ γR
)
Compared to the noise generated by multiple system
nodes, the environment noise is negligible and thus is
omitted here to simply the analysis. Notice that R1 ={
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
, then
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
≤ P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2
|R1|τ ≤ γR
)
= P
(|hS,Rj∗ |2 ≤ γR|R1|τ)
≤ P (H l ≤ γR|R1|τ)
where H l = min
(∣∣hS,Rj∗ ∣∣2 , ∣∣hD,Rj∗ ∣∣2) is the largest
random variable among the n exponentially distributed random
variables min
(∣∣hS,Rj ∣∣2 , ∣∣hD,Rj ∣∣2) , j = 1, 2, · · · , n.
From reference [29], we can get the distribution func-
tion of the min
(|hS,Rj |2, |hD,Rj |2) for each relay Rj , j =
1, 2, · · · , n as following,
Fmin(|hS,Rj |2,|hD,Rj |2) (x) =
{
1− e−2x x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
From reference [29], we can also get the distribution func-
tion of random variable H l as following,
FHl (x) =
{[
1− e−2x]n x > 0
0 x ≤ 0
Therefore, we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
≤
[
1− e−2γR|R1|τ
]n
Since there are n− 1 other relays except Rj∗ , the expected
number of noise-generation nodes is given by |R1| = (n− 1)·
P
(|hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ) = (n− 1) · (1− e−τ ). Then we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
≤
[
1− e−2γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]n
Employing the same method, we can get
P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
≤
[
1− e−2γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]n
Thus, we have
P
(T )
out ≤ 2
[
1− e−2γR(n−1)(1−e−τ)τ
]n
−
[
1− e−2γR(n−1)(1−e−τ)τ
]2n
Similarly, notice that P (S)out is given by
P
(S)
out = P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
According to the definition of secrecy outage probability,
we know that
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
m⋃
i=1
{CS,Ei ≥ γE}
)
Thus, we have
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤
m∑
i=1
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
Based on the Markov inequality,
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
≤ P
(
Es · |hS,Ei|2∑
Rj∈R1 Es · |hRj ,Ei |2
≥ γE
)
= E{hRj,Ei ,j=0,1,··· ,n+mp,j 6=j∗},R1
P

|hS,Ei|2 > γE · ∑
Rj∈R1
|hRj ,Ei |2




≤ ER1

 ∏
Rj∈R1
EhRj,Ei
[
e−γE |hRj,Ei |
2
]
= ER1
[(
1
1 + γE
)|R1|]
Therefore,
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤
m∑
i=1
(
1
1 + γE
)|R1|
= m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)|R1|
Employing the same method, we can get
P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
≤ m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)|R2|
Since the expected number of noise-generation nodes is
given by |R1| = |R2| = (n− 1) · (1− e−τ ), thus, we can
get
P
(S)
out ≤ 2m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)·(1−e−τ )
−
[
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)·(1−e−τ )]2
10
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof:
Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we notice that P (T )out is
determined as
P
(T )
out = P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
Based on the definition of transmission outage probability,
we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
CS,Rj∗ ≤ γR
)
≤ P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2
|R1|τ ≤ γR
)
= P
(|hS,Rj∗ |2 ≤ γR|R1|τ)
= 1− e−γR|R1|τ
Here R1 =
{
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
. Since the expected
number of noise-generation nodes is given by |R1| = (n− 1)·
(1− e−τ ). Then we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
)
≤ 1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
Employing the same method, we can get
P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
)
≤ 1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ)τ
Thus, we have
P
(T )
out ≤ 2
[
1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]
−
[
1− e−γR(n−1)(1−e−τ )τ
]2
Notice that the eavesdropper model of Protocol 1 is the
same as that of Protocol 2, the method for ensuring secrecy
is identical to that of in Lemma 1. Thus, we can see that the
secrecy outage probability of Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 is the
same, that is,
P
(S)
out ≤ 2m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)·(1−e−τ )
−
[
m ·
(
1
1 + γE
)(n−1)·(1−e−τ )]2
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Proof:
Notice that two ways leading to transmission outage are: 1)
there are no candidate relays in the relay selection region; 2)
the SINR at the selected relay or the destination is less than
γR. Let A1 be the event that there is at least one relay in the
relay selection region, and A2 be the event that there are no
relays in the relay selection region. We have
P
(T )
out = P
(T )
out|A1P (A1) + P
(T )
out|A2P (A2)
Since the relay is uniformly distributed, the
number of candidate relays is a binomial distribution(
n, (1− 2a) (1− 2b)
)
. We have
P (A1) = 1− ϑ
and
P (A2) = ϑ
where ϑ =
[
1 − (1− 2a) (1− 2b)
]n
. When event A2
happens, no relay is available. Then
P
(T )
out|A2 = 1
Thus, we have
P
(T )
out = P
(T )
out|A1 (1− ϑ) + 1 · ϑ
Notice that P (T )out|A1 is determined as
P
(T )
out|A1 = P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣A1
)
+ P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
∣∣∣∣A1
)
− P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣A1
)
· P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
∣∣∣∣A1
)
Based on the definition of transmission outage probability,
we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣A1
)
= P
(
CS,Rj∗ ≤ γR
∣∣∣∣A1
)
= P


Es ·
|hS,Rj∗ |
2
dα
S,Rj∗∑
Rj∈R1 Es ·
|hRj,Rj∗ |2
dα
Rj,Rj∗
+ N02
≤ γR
∣∣∣∣A1


.
= P


|hS,Rj∗ |
2
dαS,Rj∗∑
Rj∈R1
|hRj,Rj∗ |2
dαRj,Rj∗
≤ γR
∣∣∣∣A1


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Compared to the noise generated by multiple system
nodes, the environment noise is negligible and thus is
omitted here to simply the analysis. Notice that R1 ={
j 6= j∗ : |hRj ,Rj∗ |2 < τ
}
, then
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣A1
)
≤ P
( |hS,Rj∗ |2d−αS,Rj∗∑
Rj∈R1 τd
−α
Rj ,Rj∗
≤ γR
∣∣∣∣A1
)
As shown in Fig 2 that by assuming the coordinate of
Rj as (x, y), we can see that the number of noise gen-
erating nodes in square [x, x+ dx] × [y, y + dy] will be
(n− 1) (1− e−τ ) dxdy. Then, we have
∑
Rj∈R1
τ
dαRj ,Rj∗
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
τ (n− 1) (1− e−τ )[(
x− xRj∗
)2
+
(
y − yRj∗
)2]α2 dxdy
where
(
xRj∗ , yRj∗
)
is the coordinate of the selected relay
Rj∗ , xRj∗ ∈ [a, 1− a] , yRj∗ ∈ [b, 1− b] and a ∈ [0, 0.5] , b ∈
[0, 0.5].
Notice that within the network area, where relays are
uniformly distributed, the worst case location for the selected
relay Rj∗ is the point (0.5, 0.5), at which the interference from
the noise generating nodes is the largest; whereas, the best case
location for the selected relay Rj∗ is the four corner points
(a, b), (a, 1 − b), (1 − a, b) and (1 − a, 1 − b) of the relay
selection, where the interference from the noise generating
nodes is the smallest. By considering the worst case location
for the selected relay Rj∗ , we have
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣A1
)
≤ P
( |hS,Rj∗ |2d−αS,Rj∗
τ (n− 1) (1− e−τ )ϕ1 ≤ γR
∣∣∣∣A1
)
Here
ϕ1 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1[
(x− 0.5)2 + (y − 0.5)2
]α
2
dxdy
Due to a ≤ dS,Rj∗ ≤
√
(1− a)2 + (0.5− b)2, and let φ =√
(1− a)2 + (0.5− b)2, then
P
(
O
(T )
S→Rj∗
∣∣∣∣A1
)
≤ P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2φ−α
τ (n− 1) (1− e−τ )ϕ1 ≤ γR
∣∣∣∣A1
)
= P
(
|hS,Rj∗ |2 ≤
γRτ (n− 1) (1− e−τ )ϕ1
φ−α
∣∣∣∣A1
)
= 1− e−
γRτ(n−1)(1−e−τ)ϕ1
φ−α
Employing the same method, we can get
P
(
O
(T )
Rj∗→D
∣∣∣∣A1
)
≤ 1− e−
γRτ(n−1)(1−e−τ)ϕ2
φ−α
here,
ϕ2 =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1[
(x− 1)2 + (y − 0.5)2
]α
2
dxdy
Then, we have
P
(T )
out|A1 ≤ 1− e
−
γRτ(n−1)(1−e−τ)
φ−α
(ϕ1+ϕ2)
Thus, we have
P
(T )
out ≤
[
1− e−
γRτ(n−1)(1−e−τ )
φ−α (ϕ1+ϕ2)
]
(1− ϑ) + 1 · ϑ
Notice that P (S)out is given by
P
(S)
out = P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
+ P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
− P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
· P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
According to the definition of secrecy outage probability,
we know that
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
= P
(
m⋃
i=1
{CS,Ei ≥ γE}
)
Thus, we have
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤
m∑
i=1
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
Based on the definition of r0, we denote by G(i)1 the event
that the distance between Ei and the source is less than r0,
and denote by G(i)2 the event that distance between Ei and the
source is lager than or equal to r0. We have
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
= P
(
CS,Ei ≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)1
)
P
(
G
(i)
1
)
+ P
(
CS,Ei ≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2
)
P
(
G
(i)
2
)
≤ 1 · 1
2
pir0
2 + P
(
CS,Ei ≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2
)(
1− 1
2
pir0
2
)
of which
P
(
CS,Ei ≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2
)
≤ P

 |hS,Ei|2r0−α
Γ
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1[
(x−xEi)
2
+(y−yEi)
2
]α
2
dxdy
≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2


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where (xEi , yEi) is the coordinate of the eavesdropper Ei.
Γ is the sum of (n− 1) (1− e−τ ) independent exponential
random variables.
From Fig 2 we know that the largest interference at eaves-
dropper Ei happens when Ei is located at the point (0.5, 0.5),
while the smallest interference at Ei happens it is located at
the four corners of the network region. By considering the
smallest interference at eavesdroppers, we then have
P
(
CS,Ei ≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2
)
≤ P
( |hS,Ei|2r0−α
Γψ
≥ γE
)
= P
(|hS,Ei|2 ≥ ΓγE · ψ · r0α)
here
ψ =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
1
(x2 + y2)
α
2
dxdy
Based on the Markov inequality,
P
(
CS,Ei ≥ γE
∣∣∣∣G(i)2
)
≤ EΓ
[
e−ΓγEψr0
α
]
=
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )
Then, we have
P (CS,Ei ≥ γE)
≤ 1
2
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )(
1− 1
2
pir0
2
)
Employee the same method, we have
P
(
CRj∗ ,Ei ≥ γE
)
≤ pir02 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ) (
1− pir02
)
Notice that
1
2
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ)(
1− 1
2
pir0
2
)
= pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ) (
1− pir02
)
− 1
2
pir0
2
[
1−
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ )]
≤ pir02 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ) (
1− pir02
)
Therefore
P
(
O
(S)
S→Rj∗
)
≤ P
(
O
(S)
Rj∗→D
)
≤ m
[
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pir02
)]
Then, we have
P
(S)
out ≤ 2m
[
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pir02
)]
−
[
m
(
pir0
2 +
(
1
1 + γEψr0α
)(n−1)(1−e−τ ) (
1− pir02
))]2
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